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INTRODUCTION

A

dvances in nanotechnology have increasingly been facilitating novel applications in a wide range of fields including materials, electronics, photonics, biotechnology and life sciences. The ability to design and manipulate
molecules with specific properties at the nanoscale level allows scientists to
achieve outcomes that are of potential use in hostilities, including—but by
no means limited to—increased electrical efficiency of solid-state laser
weapons; 1 enhanced or tailored blast and detonation parameters of blast
weapons, such as thermobaric explosives using nano-energetic composites;2
miniaturization of unmanned aerial vehicles (known as “nano air vehicles,”
“ultra-lightweight airborne vehicles” or “wide area search autonomous attack miniature munitions”) that can also operate collectively in a coordinated, self-organized manner with the use of swarm intelligence technology;3
and controlled, sustained delivery of biochemical agents, which could limit
and regulate the spread of biochemical agents and other toxins within defined parameters.4
1. In April 2013 the U.S. Navy announced plans to deploy for the first time a solidstate laser weapon aboard USS Ponce, which has been developed through the Solid State
Laser Technology Maturation Program. Jason Kelly, Navy Unveils Its First Laser Gun, NAVY
LIFE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/04/10/solid-state-laser-gun-to-beplaced-aboard-uss-ponce/. For information on the program, see Solid State Laser Technology
Maturation Program, ONR (Sept. 2012), http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/FactSheets/Solid-State-Laser-Technology-Maturation-Program.aspx.
2. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE NANOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 6–7
(2009), available at http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/dod-report
_to_congress_final_1mar10.pdf; Andrzej W. Miziolek, Nanoenergetics: An Emerging Technology Area of National Importance, AMPTIAC NEWSLETTER, Spring 2002, at 43, 44.
3. Press Release, U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, Time Magazine Recognizes DARPA’s Hummingbird Nano Air Vehicle (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http:// automotive-area.blogspot.com/2011/11/time-magazine-recognizes-darpas.html [hereinafter
DARPA Press Release]; William A. Davis, Nano Air Vehicles: A Technology Forecast (2007),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/bh_davis.pdf. On April 14, 2015,
the U.S. Office of Naval Research announced recent technology demonstrations of
swarming unmanned aerial vehicles as part of the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology
(LOCUST) program. Press Release, Office of Naval Research, LOCUST: Autonomous,
Swarming UAVs Fly into the Future (Apr. 14, 2015), available at http://www.onr.navy.
mil/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2015/LOCUST-low-cost-UAV-swarm-ONR.aspx.
4. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KOSAL, NANOTECHNOLOGY FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 90–93 (2009).
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While these novel applications of nanotechnology for military purposes
are not specifically prohibited by any weapons treaties, the employment of
the means of warfare enhanced by nanotechnology must comply with the
various requirements of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). The application
of the relevant rules to specific nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced
weapons, or even to conventional means of warfare in an environment
where engineered nanoparticles are widely and heavily used, may pose challenges in terms of how the relevant LOAC rules should be interpreted in
light of the specific characteristics of the weapon or the weapon system
and its effects in the battlefield.5 Yet, those are the challenges that need to
be—and can be—resolved through rigorous debate on the interpretation
and application of relevant principles and rules in each specific context,
rather than requiring or demanding changes to them. Commanders play a
key role in ensuring that new technology weapons, including nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons, comply with the law when they are
employed, leaving no accountability gap no matter how technologies
evolve.6
Notwithstanding the enduring value and relevance of the LOAC principles and rules developed over several hundred years and through lessons
learned from their application in armed conflict, there remains room for
those principles and rules to change through State practice and agreement,
often informed by technological advances and their perceived impact on
the battlefield. 7 As Michael Schmitt has most relevantly observed,

5. For details, see the author’s earlier studies. Hitoshi Nasu, Nanotechnology and the Law
of Armed Conflict, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 143 (Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014); Hitoshi Nasu, Nanotechnology and Challenges to
International Humanitarian Law: A Preliminary Legal Assessment, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 653 (2012); Hitoshi Nasu & Tom Faunce, Nanotechnology and the International Law of Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weapons, 20 JOURNAL OF LAW,
INFORMATION AND SCIENCE 20 (2010).
6. Similarly, in relation to autonomous weapon systems, see Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Examining Autonomous Weapon Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict Perspective, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 213; Kenneth Anderson,
Daniel Reisner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386, 405 (2014).
7. Cf. Barry Kellman, Of Guns and Grotius, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
& POLICY 465 (2014) (observing international law’s failure to adequately appreciate the
impact of explosive weapons).
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“[t]echnology determines how wars can be fought.” 8 Law, on the other
hand, determines how wars should be fought, which necessarily interacts
with how wars can be fought as it changes with the introduction of new technologies onto the battlefield. This article considers the potential of military
applications of nanotechnology to drive changes to the existing law, with
specific focus on its ability to produce more sophisticated, miniaturized and
tailored weapons and weapon systems that enable mechanical precision of
strikes with no or few civilian casualties. To that end, it critically revisits the
fundamental rationales—particularly military necessity and humanity—
underpinning various principles and rules of weapons law, questioning
whether and to what extent the existing balancing of those fundamental
rationales can withstand pragmatic changes introduced by nanotechnology.
In order to avoid unnecessary academic discussion of unlikely hypotheticals for the purpose of pure academic interest, this article proceeds
with two important limitations on the premise upon which the analysis is
developed: technological feasibility (at least in a foreseeable future) and
practical utility. There are many wild speculations about what nanotechnology may enable us to produce—such as autonomous, self-replicating
“nano-bots” (nano-scale machines) and micro-fusion nuclear weapons—
however, it is doubtful whether these are technologically feasible within the
period addressed in this article.9 Scientists are indeed working towards miniaturization of unmanned aerial vehicles, as demonstrated by the United
States’ Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s “nano air vehicles”
program,10 yet further miniaturization to micro- or nano-sized robots is at
least a few decades away. The development of artificial intelligence is making parallel progress, yet it will take decades before autonomous weapon
systems will be capable of compliance with targeting law requirements, 11
and even longer for it to be miniaturized to a size that is sufficiently small
to be installed on “nano-bots” to enable their autonomous operation.

8. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF
WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 137, 137 (Anthony M.
Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
9. For a physicist’s perspective, see JÜRGEN ALTMANN, MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGY: POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AND PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL 27–31, 100–101
(2006).
10. DARPA Press Release, supra note 3.
11. Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36
Weapons Reviews, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 483, 491 (2012).
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Even if these were technologically feasible options, the actual employment of those weapons in the way that commentators are speculating may
not be practically viable. For example, weaponization of artificial intelligence with the capacity to operate beyond pre-programmed parameters
through autonomous learning now appears to be feasible.12 However, employing autonomous weapon systems that independently operate beyond
pre-programmed parameters may not practically serve the interest of the
commanders, who would rather use them to gather high fidelity information in order to permit reassessment of constantly changing situations,
and in a manner that ensures they operate exactly as commanders direct to
support the achievement of specific military objectives.
With these two limitations in mind, this article first explains how the
existing principles and rules of weapons law regulate military applications
of nanotechnology in light of the specific characteristics of the weapons
that will be enabled or enhanced by the use of nanotechnology. Second, it
examines the transformative impact of nanotechnology -enabled or
-enhanced weapons on existing weapons law. In doing so, it dissects the
law into its constitutive elements of military necessity and humanity, while
identifying two different understandings of humanity: one concerning the
protection of civilians from armed attack and the other concerning the protection of lawful targets from certain means and methods of warfare.
Third, it further explores the potential of nanotechnology to drive a change
to existing weapons law by contextualizing this question against two aca12 . See, e.g., Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control through Deep Reinforcement
Learning, 518 NATURE 529 (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/
v518/n7540/full/nature14236.html. The potential development of this capability raises
concerns for its ability to comply with the targeting law requirements under the law of
armed conflict and also for a potential accountability gap. See, e.g., Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308 (2014); Tim McFarland &
Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems be Liable for
War Crimes?, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 361 (2014); Chantal Grut, The Challenge of
Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law, 18 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT &
SECURITY LAW 5 (2013); David Akerson, The Illegality of Offensive Lethal Autonomy, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WAR 65
(David Saxon ed., 2013); Markus Wagner, Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently Operating
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, in id. at 99; Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and Legality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 627 (2012). Cf. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY
JOURNAL 231 (2013) (warning against analysis based on unfounded assumptions).
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demic debates that have recently taken place: one on the power to kill or
capture and another on the legality of incapacitating chemical agents.
It concludes with the finding that nanotechnology challenges a fundamental assumption that reducing civilian casulaties makes warfare more
“humane,” which has long supported—and sometimes hindered—the development of the principles and rules of weapons law, while highlighting
practical considerations that have the potential to lead to the creation of
new principles and rules.
II.

NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF WEAPONRY

Any military application of new technologies is subject to the wellestablished principle under the law of armed conflict that “[i]n any armed
conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means
of warfare is not unlimited.”13 This principle is further elaborated through
various rules of weapons law with express restrictions on the choice of
weapons (means of warfare), which is the focus of this article, as well as on
the way in which weapons are employed (methods of warfare).14 The way
in which the choice of weapons or means of warfare is restricted is twofold: the general, principle-based approach and the more specific, rulebased approach. The general principles of weapons law prohibit:

13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35(1), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. See also Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Judge Weeramantry elaborated on the multicultural
traditions underpinning limitations to the conduct of warfare in his dissenting opinion in
the Legality of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 478–82 (Weeramantry, J. dissenting) (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of Nuclear Weapons].
14. See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to Legal Review of
New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 931, 937 (2006); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE 142 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
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 the employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury” or
“calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”;15
 the use of weapons that indiscriminately affect both lawful targets and civilians;16 and
 the employment of “methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment.”17
In addition, States have agreed in a variety of international treaties to
specific and express prohibitions of weapons, including the employment of
projectiles of a weight below 400 grammes that are explosive or charged
with fulminating or inflammable substances;18 expanding bullets;19 asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases;20 biological weapons;21 chemical weapons;22
15. Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.
23(e), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Hague Regulations, supra note 13, art.
23(e). Although the authentic French text remained the same (maux superflus), the identical
phrase in the two instruments was translated differently. For the English translation of the
treaty texts, see JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS
OF 1899 AND 1907 116 (1915). Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I placed those two
expressions side by side. See also 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (2005).
16. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51(4); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK,
supra note 15, r. 71.
17. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 35(3).
18. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at
54 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
19. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S.
459, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 13, at 64.
20. Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion
of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 453, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
13, at 60; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 158.
21. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 11 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 309 [hereinafter BWC].
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blinding laser weapons;23 anti-personnel mines;24 and, most recently, cluster
munitions.25
Of the three general principles, chiefly relevant to the legal consideration of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons is the principle
prohibiting superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. As William Boothby succinctly notes, in determining the legality of a weapon with nanotechnological components, “[t]he focus will be on whether the fact that certain
components are based on nanotechnology makes a significant difference to
the wounding or injuring effect of the weapon or to the suffering its designed use is going to occasion.”26 Yet, as discussed elsewhere, the indeterminacy and controversy over the interpretation of this principle poses
significant challenges to its application for the purpose of assessing the legality of specific nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons.27
The unique ability provided by nanotechnology to design and manipulate molecules with specific properties at the nanoscale level will, at least in
the foreseeable future, be principally directed at miniaturizing weapons and
weapons platforms; enhancing the accuracy and manipulability of precision
attacks; and providing greater force protection. The focus on these programs results from the fact that weapons development in technologically
developed countries is prioritized in response to the immediate needs of
their military forces in existing or anticipated theaters of operation. Accordingly, the possibility of nanotechnology raising an issue with the principle prohibiting indiscriminate weapons is negligible.28 Rather, nanotechnology will be found attractive in enabling existing weapons to be more
discriminate by allowing mechanical precision and manipulation of attacks
(for example, with miniaturized unmanned aerial vehicles or self-guiding
22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45,
reprinted in 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 800 [hereinafter CWC].
23. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 535.
24. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
25. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39.
26. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, CONFLICT LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF NEW WEAPONS
TECHNOLOGY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMERGING ACTORS 183 (2014).
27. For a detailed analysis by the author, see Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 34.
28. An exception is the use of nano-energetic composites to enhance the power of
blast weapons. For the author’s analysis of the legal implications, see Nasu, Nanotechnology
and the Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 5, at 146–49.
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bullets with nanotechnology-enhanced sensors) or more focused application of force (demonstrated by, for instance, the solid-state laser weapon
system in comparison to other types of directed energy weapons, such as
the Active Denial System). 29 The third general principle—prohibiting
weapons which are intended, or may be expected, to cause “widespread,
long-term and severe damage” to the natural environment—is relevant to
the extent that engineered nanoparticles may be found to have toxic effects. However, there is great uncertainty whether the dispersion of toxic
engineered nanoparticles will ever satisfy the evidentiary standards necessary to establish they have caused widespread, long-term and severe damage.30
On the other hand, nanotechnology, if used to develop weapons that
are specifically prohibited or restricted, would be subject to the relevant
weapons treaty. These treaties prohibit particular weapons or restrict their
use by reference to the weapon’s construction and characteristics, unlike
the weapons law principles, which tend to refer to the effects produced by
the use of weapons.31 The definition of the prohibited weapon under these
treaties tends to be so specific that any application of nanotechnology that
does not meet that particular design intent will not be covered. For example, the solid-state laser weapon system is not prohibited under the 1995
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, as it is not “specifically designed, as
[its] sole combat function or as one of [its] combat functions, to cause

29. The Active Defense System uses millimeter waves to “zap” the surface of the skin
producing intense pain without actual injury. Colin Campbell, Raytheon Non-Lethal Heat
Beam Tackles New Missions, BREAKING DEFENSE (Nov. 5, 2013), http://breakingdefen
se.com/2013/11/raytheon-non-lethal-heat-beam-tackles-new-missions/. For legal issues
concerning directed energy weapons, see, e.g., Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 11, at
499–502; Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need to Conduct
Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as “Weapons,” 66 AIR
FORCE LAW REVIEW 157, 177–79 (2010); Louise Doswald-Beck & Gérald C. Cauderay,
The Development of New Anti-Personnel Weapons, 30 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 565, 573–74 (1990).
30. For details, see Nasu, Nanotechnology and Challenges to International Humanitarian Law,
supra note 5, at 663–65.
31. Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium, in
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 185, 192 (Michael N.
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1999) (Vol. 71, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES).
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permanent blindness to unenhanced vision”32 even if it were to have an
effect of causing blindness.33
By contrast, under treaties that prohibit and restrict the use of an entire
class of weapons, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the treaty language is broad
enough to encompass and prohibit technological advances. For example,
the scope of the BWC, which was adopted with the objective of “exclud[ing] completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins being used as weapons,”34 extends to cover a wide variety of applications of nanotechnology producing or enhancing toxic effects, as these are
likely to come within the notion of “[m]icrobial or other biological agents,
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes.”35 Pinson argues that the Convention deals only with
biological organisms or living products and therefore does not extend to
the artificially or synthetically engineered products that nanotechnology
would produce.36 However, such a restrictive interpretation would be difficult to maintain. First, the distinction between nanotechnology and biological elements of biotechnology is artificial. High-profile accomplishments in
synthetic biotechnology pose scenarios for possible construction of de novo
biological agents without relying on naturally occurring pathogens. 37 Second, in addition to microbial and biological agents, Article I of the BWC
32. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 23, art. 1.
33. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 210–11
(2009). Compare, however, with the legality of dense inert metal explosives under the 1980
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, as discussed in
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 33–34.
34. BWC, supra note 21, pmbl. para. 9. Strictly speaking, the Convention does not explicitly prohibit the “use” of biological weapons, but the 1996 Fourth Review Conference
confirmed that Article 1 effectively prohibits use. Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Nov.
25–Dec. 6, 1996, Geneva, Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, para. 3 (1996),
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/Fourth_Review.shtml.
35. BWC, supra note 21, art. I.
36. Robert D. Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited by the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Convention?, 22 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 279, 298 (2004).
37. For details, see, e.g., Gautam Mukunda, Kenneth A. Oye & Scott C. Mohr, What
Rough Beast? Synthetic Biology, Uncertainty, and the Future of Biosecurity, 28 POLITICS AND THE
LIFE SCIENCES 2 (2009); MARKUS SCHMIDT ET AL., SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES (2009).
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makes an explicit reference to “toxins whatever their origin or method of
production.” The travaux préparatoires show that Sweden sought to define
toxins widely to cover all toxins of both biological and synthetic origin.38 It
was in this context that Sweden proposed a broad definition of toxins
(which was adopted in the final text) to ensure that there would remain no
loophole undermining the purpose of the Convention.39 This broad definition was also confirmed in the Final Declaration of the Second Review
Conference.40 Even after the adoption of the CWC in 1993, the broad definition of toxins suggests there is no gap between the two Conventions
such that no production of toxic substances through the application of
nanotechnology would be unregulated.
This does not mean that any application of nanotechnology that produces or enhances toxic effects would be automatically prohibited under
the BWC. The Convention only prohibits biological agents or toxins “of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,” 41 while leaving what exactly constitutes
“peaceful purposes” indeterminate.42 In other words, the use of nanotechnology to develop or produce biological agents or toxins is not prohibited
if it can be justified as being used for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes. Likewise, the development of nanotechnology-assisted
equipment or methods of delivery, such as encapsulation, is also lawful unless it is used for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict. The significance
38 . Sweden, Working Paper on Some Aspects of the Definition of Toxins, U.N. Doc.
CCD/333 (July 6, 1971), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
SUPPLEMENT FOR 1971, at 46–47 (1973).
39. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Feb. 23, 1971–Sept. 30, 1971, Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, ¶¶ 49–50, U.N. Doc. DC/234 (Oct. 6,
1971), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SUPPLEMENT FOR
1971, at 5 (1973).
40. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction, Sept. 8–26, 1986, Geneva, Final Declaration art. I, Doc.
BWC/CONF.II/13/II (Sep. 26, 1986) (reaffirming “that the Convention unequivocally
applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production”). See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: WHO
GUIDANCE Annex 2: Toxins, at 214–15 (2004).
41. BWC, supra note 21, art. I.
42. See Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case
of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271
(2007).
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of the exceptions is reinforced by Article X of the BWC, which recognizes
the rights of the contracting parties to pursue the development and application of scientific discoveries and the exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.
Using nanotechnology to develop new chemical agents (whether their
toxicity is proven or not), or to modify and enhance existing ones,43 will
more clearly fall within the purview of the CWC. The CWC aims to comprehensively ban all uses, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the
types and quantities are consistent with such purposes”; “munitions and
devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties”; and “any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of [such] munitions and devices.”44 The
Convention defines “toxic chemicals” as “any chemical[s] which through
[their] chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals . . . regardless of their
origin or of their method of production,” and “precursors” as “any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever
method of a toxic chemical.”45 To assist in applying verification measures,
specific toxic chemicals and precursors are listed in the schedules annexed
to the Convention, but the Convention prohibits all substances that come
within its comprehensive definition of toxic chemicals regardless of whether they are listed in the schedules or not.46 Like the BWC, however, the
prohibition of toxic chemicals and their precursors under the CWC is not
absolute, allowing chemicals used for “purposes not prohibited under this
Convention”—namely, peaceful purposes (such as industrial, agricultural,
43. Ralf Trapp, Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.armscontrol org/act/2008_
03/Trapp.
44. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(1).
45. Id., arts. II(2), II(3).
46. Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, Article II: Definitions and Criteria, in THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 73, 77 (Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer & Ralf
Trapp eds., 2014). The delegates to Second Review Conference of the CWC States Parties,
held in 2008, also considered that the existing Convention definitions were adequate to
cover developments in science and technology in the application of the Convention to
toxic chemicals. Conference of the States Parties, Apr. 7–18, 2008, Report of the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (Second Review Conference), ¶ 9.22, Doc. RC-2/4 (Apr. 18, 2008).
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research, medical, pharmaceutical), protective purposes, military purposes
not connected with their use as a method of warfare, and law enforcement
purposes.47 Thus, nanotechnology-enabled chemical agents are not considered to be chemical weapons unless they are deployed with the intention to
utilize the toxicity of those chemical agents.48
It is thus clear that there is no legal gap or loophole that can be exploited with the use of nanotechnology to disguise a violation of weapons law
principles or rules. These principles and rules are either broad enough to
address technological advances (albeit with a degree of indeterminacy) or
specific enough to exclude nanotechnology developed weapons that are
prohibited by weapons treaties. However, the adequacy of the existing
principles and rules of weapons law still needs to be reviewed in light of the
specific characteristics of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons
or weapon systems and their transformative impact on the means and
methods of warfare employed in the future battlespace.
III.

WEAPONS LAW PARADOX

A frequent criticism is that law continues to lag behind technological advancement, treaties prohibiting or restricting specific technological developments tending to be reactive and defined restrictively with technical precision.49 This is because the adoption of such treaties necessarily depends
on multiple variables including—but by no means limited to—strategic
considerations, military necessity, political interests and costs associated
with weapons development, as well as a catalytic event that rapidly escalates
public stigmatization of a particular weapons technology.50 Negotiations for
regulating specific technological developments pose particular challenges as
it is difficult to fully appreciate the transformative impacts of weapons
47. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(9).
48. See Krutzsch & Trapp, supra note 46, at 75 (even with toxic side effects when such
weapons are used).
49. Timothy L.H. McCormack, A Non Liquet on Nuclear Weapons—The ICJ Avoids the
Application of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 316 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 76, 90 (1997).
50. Robert McLaughlin & Hitoshi Nasu, Introduction: Conundrum of New Technologies in
the Law of Armed Conflict, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 5, at 1, 12–13. In recent years, civil society has increased its influence on the
development of weapon treaties. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Ottawa Convention Banning
Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International
Civil Society, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2000).
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technology and the full implications of its regulation in the future battlespace.
As a result of balancing competing interests during diplomatic negotiations, drafting a weapons treaty tends to become arbitrary line-drawing and
one that lacks coherent, principle-based reasoning.51 For example, explosive projectiles prohibited under the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration were
limited to those weighing under 400 grammes, a more or less arbitrary distinction, reflecting the dividing line discernible at that time between explosive artillery and rifle munitions, only the latter being considered dispensable in terms of their military utility.52
An example of where technology has altered the manner in which
weapons may be employed is that of flattening or expanding bullets, whose
use against enemy forces during armed conflict is prohibited under the
1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets. 53 These rounds
have been radically refined with technological advancement, to the point
that they have become a preferred munition for policing because they have
better immediate stopping power than full-metal-jacketed rounds and tend
to stay in the body of the target rather than passing through and creating
risk to bystanders.54 A similar situation may soon arise with regard to biological and chemical weapons, with nanotechnology enabling a targeted
delivery of biochemical agents without a risk of uncontrolled dispersal.
These weapons (as will be discussed further below in relation to incapacitating chemical agents) may become a preferred means of disabling the target in law enforcement operations, while their use during armed combat
would remain prohibited.

51. See BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 60.
52. Frits Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments and International Law, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS
185, 207–8 (1985-II). Later, light explosive or incendiary projectiles weighing less than
400 g were developed and have been widely accepted unless they are used against persons.
See id. at 223.
53. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, supra note 19. Note, however,
that the customary international law status of this prohibition is disputed. See OFFICE OF
THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL
§ 6.5.4.4 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
54. Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and “Expanding” Bullets: Limited Law Enforcement
Exceptions and Unwarranted Handcuffs?, in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 8, at 193, 199; Robert McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles and the Law of Naval Warfare, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 229,
237.
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To the extent that weapons treaties are considered to be a particular
manifestation of the general principles of weapons law, such as the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and the prohibition of
indiscriminate weapons, technological advances, combined with the changing nature of hostilities, may create a disjuncture between the original rationale underpinning the weapons treaty and the general principles of
weapons law. This may happen, for example, due to the increased military
necessity of a particular weapon prohibited under the treaty (as is the case
with flattening and expanding bullets) or the development of technology
that enables a weapon prohibited as inherently indiscriminate to be more
discriminately targetable (as is arguably the case with nanotechnologyenabled targeted delivery of biochemical agents). With further exploitation
of the unique ability provided by nanotechnology to miniaturize weapons
and weapons platforms, enhance accuracy and manipulability of precision
attacks, and provide a greater range of focused force application, this disjuncture may loom larger, generating a “weapons law paradox.” This paradox leaves weapons that are intrinsically illegal under the general principles
unregulated,55 while weapons that are not considered as conflicting with the
general principles are found to be regulated by a specific weapons treaty.
The dynamics that cause this paradox can be better understood when
the weapons law principles are dissected into the constitutive elements—
military necessity and humanity—that underpin many of the existing rules
of the law of armed conflict, including those concerning weaponry.56 These
elements are not fixed, but are subject to change over the course of years
and centuries as technology evolves and the nature of warfare changes.
Thus, at the dawn of twentieth century the use of flattening and expanding
rounds was viewed as causing unnecessary suffering, even in light of the
military necessity of stopping advancing soldiers who continued to fight

55. For such arguments, see, e.g., EITAN BARAK, DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179–202 (2011); Jason A. Beckett,
Interim Legality: A Mistaken Assumption?—An Analysis of Depleted Uranium Munitions under
Contemporary International Humanitarian Law, 3 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
43 (2004); Owen Thomas Gibbons, Uses and Effects of Depleted Uranium Munitions: Towards a
Moratorium on Use, 7 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 191, 206–24
(2004).
56. See especially Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 795 (2010).
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after suffering an injury from a single completely jacketed rifle bullet.57 Today military necessity arguably demands the use of such bullets, for example, in a counterterrorism operation in a densely populated area or on
board a civilian aircraft to minimize the risk of collateral damage inflicted
upon innocent bystanders.58 A similar observation can be made when, for
example nanotechnology contributes to the development of an antipersonnel explosive munition that is designed to explode inside the human
body or detonate on impact with human tissue causing damage within only
a defined parameter, which would significantly reduce the risk of civilian
casualties in the vicinity of a lawful target, even in a densely populated area.
It has been widely affirmed that the anti-personnel munition that is designed to explode within the human body or detonate on impact with the
human tissue is prohibited as causing superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering under customary international law.59 Could these changes of circumstances, including those facilitated by military applications of nanotechnology, disturb the equilibrium that underpinned the ban on these
weapons as a clear manifestation of the superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering principle and render the St. Petersburg Declaration completely
obsolete?
Before reaching any conclusion on this question, it must be acknowledged that the notion of humanity may also evolve as the technology affects the way in which wars can be fought and also, arguably, as the societal

57. See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERTHE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 276–78 (1920) (Remarks by General Sir John
Ardagh). See also Frits Kalshoven, The Soldier and His Golf Clubs, in ETUDES ET ESSAYS SUR
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE,
EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN PICTET 369, 374–76 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
58. Remarks reportedly made by Christopher Greenwood in his keynote address,
“Legal Aspects of Current Regulations,” Third International Workshop on Wound Ballistics, Thun, Switzerland, March 28–29, 2001, cited in W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons
and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55, 89–90
(2005). See also Steven Haines, Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, in PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 258, 272 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2005); George. H. Aldrich, Customary International
Humanitarian Law—An Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 503, 520 (2006).
59. See especially HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 15, r. 78; BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 142–43. Cf. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 53, § 6.5.4.3.
ENCES:
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perception of acceptable human suffering changes.60 The notion of humanity in the general context of the law of armed conflict is primarily—at least
as it currently stands—understood by reference to the protection of civilians, as found in rules such as the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons, as
well as in the related principles of discrimination, proportionality and the
duty to exercise precautions in targeting (what I will refer to as the first
thesis of humanity). This notion of humanity in warfare is not new. The
1863 Lieber Code reads:
As civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country
itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.61

It is this meaning of humanity that is used as an underlying logic in the
scenarios introduced above to drive a potential shifting of the balance, not
against military necessity, but in reinforcing the military necessity of employing weapons that would otherwise be considered prohibited as causing
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. What, then, is the element of
humanity that is actually sacrificed in this trade-off?
Unlike the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons, which aims to protect civilians from attack, the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering
principle applies regardless of the legal status of the person upon which the
injury or suffering is inflicted. Indeed, the notion of humanity in this sense
is articulated in the St. Petersburg Declaration which states in its preamble
that “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of
disabled man, or render their death inevitable . . . would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.”62 This principle, as reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a

60. For the military ethics debate on this point, see, e.g., PAULINE M. KAURIN, THE
WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYMMETRICAL (2014).
61. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field art. 22, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004).
62. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 18.
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State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,63 provides the cardinal legal protection (and a few particular manifestations of it under specific treaties)
accorded to combatants and others who may be lawfully targeted in terms
of the means of warfare that may be legitimately employed against them
(what I will refer to as the second thesis of humanity). It is this second thesis of humanity that is sacrificed in the trade-off in the scenarios described
above, i.e., the element of humanity which concerns the protection of
combatants and other lawful targets from superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and, arguably, inevitable death, rather than the first thesis of
humanity, which provides that the “unarmed citizen is to be spared.” Although this second thesis of humanity is not to be sacrificed under the current understanding and application of the principle of humanity, this customary international law rule may undergo reformation if it can be shown
that military necessity derives, for example, from an anti-personnel explosive munition designed to cause damage within only a defined parameter,
and if State practice demonstrates over time that the superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering principle is not interpreted as prohibiting such a munition.64
IV.

THE POTENTIAL OF NANOTECHNOLOGY TO BRING CHANGE TO
THE LAW OF WEAPONRY

At the advent of an era in which nanotechnology enables the development
and enhancement of focused force application capabilities that can reduce
the risk of civilian casualties, it is likely that tension will arise between the
two theses of humanity, rather than between a single, fixed notion of humanity and military necessity. While achieving a greater level of precision
and certainty of lethality against lawful targets could reduce civilian casualties and make warfare more “humane,” it may at the same time prompt us
to revisit the second thesis of humanity—that limits the degree of injury or
suffering that can be inflicted upon lawful targets—and re-examine its role
in applying and developing the law of weaponry in the context of future
warfare.

63. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 13, ¶¶ 77–78 (“[I]t is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing
them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.”).
64. The author is particularly grateful to Dr. Boothby for his comments in the development of this argument.
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With a focus on applications of nanotechnology that enable scientists
to produce mechanically controllable precision munitions capable of limiting the impact of the attack to a defined parameter to reduce or completely
eliminate the risk of civilian casualties, this Part considers how the second
thesis of humanity may evolve with respect to restrictions on the degree of
injury or suffering inflicted upon lawful targets. It does so by contextualizing this question in terms of two academic debates that have recently taken
place on the power to kill or capture and the legality of incapacitating
chemical agents.
A. The Power to Kill or Capture Debate
One of the recent debates where the second thesis of humanity may become of relevance is the argument, which appears in Part IX of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,65
that attempts to justify greater restrictions upon the means and methods of
warfare employed against lawful targets. Most relevantly, the Interpretive
Guidance suggests “considerations of humanity require that, within the parameters set by the specific provisions of IHL [international humanitarian
law], no more death, injury, or destruction be caused than is actually necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”66
Written in the context of direct participation in hostilities by civilians,
this statement clearly aims to extend the superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering requirement beyond its original remit of weapons law into a
broader legal context, while acknowledging that considerations of humanity
play a role only within the parameters set by the specific provisions of the
law of armed conflict. However, Nils Melzer, who was primarily responsible for the drafting of the Interpretive Guidance, appears to take the argument
a step further without articulating the restrictive role of the considerations
of humanity when he states that “the restrictive aspect of the principle of
military necessity requires that there be no reasonable alternative while in-

65. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE], available at https://
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
66. Id. at 80.
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terfering significantly less with humanitarian or other values, which IHL
aims to protect from the effects of the hostilities.”67
The problems and flaws in these arguments, extensively and convincingly discussed by Hays Parks,68 need not be repeated here. However, one
of the most relevant grounds of his critique for the purpose of the present
discussion is succinctly expressed as follows:
Other than general or specific limitations on conventional weapons, such
as those contained in the protocols to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, nations otherwise have written law of war treaties to protect war victims while prudently declining to impose treaty restrictions on decisions by battlefield commanders or individual soldiers
with respect to application of force against enemy combatants or civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities. The ICRC’s effort to the contrary with
reference to general principles such as humanity, military necessity, and proportionality is devoid of any reference to treaty provisions, or State practice,
instead attempting an approach governments have assiduously avoided.69

A more narrowly-defined and specific rule-based power to kill or capture debate has taken place between Ryan Goodman and Michael
Schmitt.70 Goodman’s central thesis focuses on the circumstances in which
an individual is considered hors de combat, in particular, whether combatants
who no longer have the means to defend themselves, but who are not injured, sick or surrendering, are indeed protected from direct attack as hors
de combat.71 Yet, more relevant to the present discussion is his attempt to
find a broader, theoretical support for his “least-restrictive-means” analysis
in the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle regulating the

67. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293–94 (2008).
68. W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769, 796–827 (2010).
69. Id. at 806 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
70. Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or
Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s “The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants,” 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 855 (2013); Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or
Capture Enemy Combatants: A Rejoinder to Michael N. Schmitt, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 863 (2013).
71. Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, supra note 70, at 830–36.
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means and methods of warfare States can employ.72 Relying on this weapons law principle, Goodman develops the following analysis:
States do not, however, retain the prerogative to use the weapon when
there is clearly no military benefit. It is in this sense that the prohibition
on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering operates. That is, either
as a result of a general principle of necessity or as a more specific prohibition on unnecessary suffering. LOAC [law of armed conflict] forbids the
use of methods and means of combat that are neither able nor intended
to achieve a military benefit.73

Assuming that by “a general principle of necessity”74 he means military necessity, then reliance on it would invite the same criticism that has been
made against the Interpretive Guidance by Parks. The notions of military necessity and humanity are both embedded in the specific rules of the law of
armed conflict and do not exist as independent prescriptive norms that can
be invoked to derogate from specific rules of the law of armed conflict or
to restrain belligerents’ freedom of conduct.75 As Schmitt remarks in his
critique of Goodman’s thesis, “every IHL rule represents an attempt by
States to craft a fair balance between the need to be effective in battle and
the desire to humanize it. . . . [I]t is not in itself a separate prescriptive
norm with independent valence.”76
With regard to the second ground of Goodman’s argument, that a particular use of a weapon may be prohibited “as a more specific prohibition
on unnecessary suffering,” the application of the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle to methods of warfare should be approached
with caution. While Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I refers not only to
weapons but also to methods of warfare, its application is subject to the
same interpretive tests as those that apply to weapons; namely, whether, by
reference either to the design intent or the effects of normal or expected
72. Id. at 836–37.
73. Id. at 837 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
74. An alternative understanding is necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in the sense of State responsibility for a breach of obligations under the law of armed
conflict; however, this does not make sense as “a general principle of necessity” is used to
restrict the freedom of State action.
75. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1389 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987).
76. Schmitt, supra note 70, at 857.
506

Nanotechnology and the Future of the Law of Weaponry

Vol. 91

use, the method is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering,77 and whether a balance exists between the degree of injury or
suffering inflicted and the degree of military necessity underlying the choice
of a particular method of warfare.78 With the exception of specifically prohibited methods of warfare such as no quarter and starvation,79 this balance
cannot be generalized or clarified without an insight into the actual situation in which the method is employed.80
A clear trend that emerges from this brief analysis of the power to kill
or capture debate is that attempts are consistently made to find a legal basis
for restricting the conduct of warfare under the notion of military necessity, giving little consideration to the humanitarian impact of technological
advances in weaponry. By restricting the application of the debate to situations where armed forces operate against selected individuals under their
control,81 the proponents of the power to capture side of the debate attempt to remove the first thesis of humanity from the equation. But in doing so, they fail to articulate the countervailing humanitarian factor to military necessity—the humanitarian considerations that render the use of a
particular means or method of warfare unnecessary, when compared to the
alternatives, to achieve the same military objective. Is it the circumstances
in which the lawful target is deprived of his or her life, or is it the particular
form of means or method of warfare—such as armed unmanned aerial vehicles (generally known as “drones”)—that allegedly renders a killing unnecessary or inhumane?
Assuming it is the circumstances in which the lawful target is deprived
of his or her life which the proponents are concerned about, given the restricted scope of their argument, its internal logic starts to collapse as the
circumstances change when an alternative method is employed. For exam77. See, e.g., James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 453, 470–71 (2006); Parks, supra note 68, at 76–82.
78. Government experts attending at the Conference on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Lucerne in 1974 were in general agreement on this point. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ¶¶ 23–24 (1975).
See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 75, ¶ 1428.
79. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 40 and 54(1), respectively.
80. See Kalshoven, supra note 52, at 234–35; Greenwood, supra note 31, at 195–99.
Note, however, their observations are made in relation to weapons.
81. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 80–81; Goodman, The Power to Kill or
Capture Enemy Combatants, supra note 70, at 826–28.
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ple, the Interpretive Guidance refers to a situation where a lawful target is sitting in a restaurant located within an area firmly controlled by the opposing
party, suggesting that this lawful target should be neutralized through capture or other non-lethal means. 82 Drawing on this proposition, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions also
argues that “rather than using drone strikes, U.S. forces should, wherever
and whenever possible, conduct arrests, or use less-than-lethal force to restrain.”83 However, as soon as an alternative method is employed, for example, using a special forces unit to capture the person, he or she may
move into an area heavily populated by civilians or may be surrounded by
civilians by the time the unit arrives, resulting in civilian casualties that
could have been avoided if the target had been engaged instantly using a
“drone.” Therefore, the proposition that a less-than-lethal means or method should be employed under certain circumstances is inextricably linked
with an assessment under the law of targeting in which the first thesis of
humanity plays a central role.
Alternatively, the proponents of the power to capture argument may
contend that it is the particular means and method of warfare adopted to
neutralize a lawful target, for example, the specific manner in which an
unmanned aerial vehicle is used to produce a lethal outcome, that is considered unnecessary or inhumane. The question then comes squarely within
the scope of weapons law, inquiring whether there is any basis for concluding that the particular means and method of warfare employed is of an inhumane nature, such as of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and whether it should be prohibited notwithstanding the
fact that it is the most effective means and method to reduce or eliminate
the risk of civilian casualties. As nanotechnology contributes to increases in
the sophistication of the application of force (e.g., through miniaturization
of unmanned aerial vehicles or self-guiding bullets) and reduces or completely eliminates the risk of civilian casualties, this will become a more relevant question, with a greater focus on the meaning and impact of the second thesis of humanity for weapons regulation. In this respect, the power
to kill or capture debate can be better seen as one possible future legal approach to weapons law, heralding a new humanitarian law era in which
82. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 81.
83. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, ¶ 77, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
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questions concerning “humane” ways to attack lawful targets may be more
fully explored, rather than as an argument that reflects lex lata.
B. The Legality of Incapacitating Chemical Agents Debate
The tension between the first and second theses of humanity has also arisen with respect to the use of incapacitating chemical agents during armed
conflict. As discussed in Part II, incapacitating agents—whether they are
made from biological pathogens or have chemical properties—are prohibited from development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention or
transfer, as well as use as weapons under any circumstances by the BWC
and the CWC. The use of nanotechnology to produce novel biochemical
agents does not create a legal loophole in the comprehensive treaty bans.
The term “never under any circumstances” that commonly appears in the
BWC and the CWC makes it clear that the use of biological and toxin
weapons, as well as chemical weapons, is prohibited both in international
and non-international armed conflict.84 The prohibition is also considered
to be customary international law.85 However, the application of the rule to
law enforcement is excluded explicitly under the CWC, and, arguably, under the BWC as one of “peaceful purposes.” 86 These exceptions to the
prohibitions may have increasingly wider implications given the expansive
nature of modern military operations, particularly in law enforcement-type
situations and the lower end of intensity of non-international armed conflicts.87
Indeed, a greater utility has recently been advocated for riot control
agents (RCAs) as a method of undertaking counterterrorism operations,88
and the United States has long maintained a policy of using RCAs in defensive military modes, in circumstances that can be interpreted as wider than
domestic law enforcement purposes. 89 On October 26, 2002, Russian
84. See BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 319, 321; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note
53, § 6.8.
85. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 15, at 256, 260.
86. See Michael Crowley, The Use of Incapacitants in Law Enforcement, in WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 357, 379–80 (Stuart Casey-Maslen ed., 2014).
87. See Watkin, supra note 54, at 196–97.
88. J.P. Perry Robinson, Difficulties Facing the Chemical Weapons Convention, 84 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 223, 228–29 (2008).
89. BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 135; David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 201,
224 (2006).
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Spetsnaz Forces deployed a chemical agent—the powerful, fast-acting opiate
Fentanyl—in a Moscow theater through its ventilation system in order to
liberate 634 hostages taken by Chechen separatists.90 This occurred arguably in the wider context of a non-international armed conflict between
Russian forces and Chechen separatists. 91 More recently, concerns have
been raised about the increased interest among States in the use of incapacitating chemical agents in situations where law enforcement operations
evolve into a non-international armed conflict, or where the State denies
the existence of an armed conflict. The practice, it is feared, would result in
a potentially dangerous erosion of the comprehensive ban on chemical
weapons.92
RCAs such as CS gas and pepper spray have been the chemical agents
traditionally used for law enforcement purposes. The CWC defines RCAs
as “[a]ny chemicals not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear
within a short time following termination of exposure.”93 There is an unresolved debate as to whether law enforcement purposes within the meaning
of the CWC are confined to the use of RCAs or could extend to the use of
incapacitating chemical agents more broadly. 94 Other chemical substances—including novel toxic chemicals produced by applications of nanotechnology, for example, to enhance temporary physical disabling effects or
90. Judith Miller & William J. Broad, Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Toxic Agent; U.S.
Suspects Opiate in Gas in Russia Raid, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/29/world/hostage-drama-in-moscow-the-toxic-agent
-us-suspects-opiate-in-gas-in-russia-raid.html.
91. For details, see, e.g., David P. Fidler, The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-Lethal” Weapons
and International Law in the 21st Century, 859 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
525 (2005).
92. See Press Release, International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Calls on
States to Prevent the Development of Toxic Chemicals as Weapons (Feb. 6, 2013), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/02-06-toxic-c
hemicals-weapons.htm; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, WEAPONS OF
TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS 132
(June 1, 2006), available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/assets/downloads/weapons_of_terr
or.pdf.
93. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(7).
94. See Krutzsch & Trapp, supra note 46, at 94–101; Crowley, supra note 86, at 375–78;
Mirko Sossai, Drugs as Weapons: Disarmament Treaties Facing the Advances in Biochemistry and
Non-Lethal Weapons Technology, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 5, 21–22
(2010); Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Historical Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION AND
PROSPECTS 17, 31 (Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti & Allan Rosas eds., 1998).
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to tailor the nature or severity of the incapacitating effects to a particular
objective desired by the user95—and their precursors could theoretically be
considered lawful if developed or used for law enforcement purposes, but
not if those substances are used as a means of warfare, or their types or
quantities produced are not consistent with their use for law enforcement
purposes.96 Yet, the fundamental distinction between means of warfare and
law enforcement should inform the design purpose if a new chemical agent
is to be developed for law enforcement purposes alone. Thus, if lethality or
permanent harm is the primary characteristic of a novel nano-chemical
agent, the presumption is that such a substance cannot be considered as
being developed or produced for law enforcement purposes.97
The central issue for the purpose of the present analysis lies with nanotechnology-enhanced incapacitating chemical agents that are not designed,
primarily at least, to be lethal or to cause permanent harm, being used for
hostile purposes in armed conflict. Even though clearly prohibited under
the CWC, if one attempts to extend the power to kill or capture debate further, it would make sense to allow the military to use such weapons in order to disable lawful targets until it becomes practicable to detain them. 98
This would be particularly so when those nanotechnology-enhanced incapacitating chemical agents can be delivered on lawful targets only, for example, by using miniaturized unmanned aerial vehicles to inject chemical
agents via physical contact with the target, shooting directly at the target
from close range, or by controlling the physical and time parameters in
which the incapacitating effects of nanotechnology-enhanced chemicals
may last.

95. For recent developments on chemical and biological weapons that are not considered to be weapons of mass destruction, see Robinson, supra note 88, at 237–38.
96. CWC, supra note 22, art. II(1)(a).
97. A more challenging question arises when lethality or permanent harm remains a
potential consequence of using a novel nano-chemical agent primarily designed for a temporary incapacitation. This question is of general relevance to so-called “non-lethal weapons,” which have been criticized for their potential lethality notwithstanding the fact that
police are routinely issued with firearms in some countries, which are designed to kill or
cause permanent harm. See generally DAVID A. KOPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE
LAW AND POLICY OF REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT (2006).
98. Concerns may still be raised that incapacitating chemical agents could be used as a
prelude to the application of lethal force against those identified as targets. However,
those who are incapacitated as a result would be considered hors de combat.
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The foundational rationale underpinning the comprehensive ban on
chemical weapons, as it appears in the preamble to the CWC, is the “prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,” indicating the shared understanding that chemical weapons are indiscriminate
in nature.99 Indeed, a report prepared by the UN Secretary-General as the
basis for possible political and legal action by States with respect to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons expressed concern that technological advances would allow them to cause casualties on a large scale and
that their effects were unpredictable. 100 This rationale resonates with the
first thesis of humanity, placing the indiscriminate risk to civilians as the
central consideration of humanity. If this was the only concern that led the
States to comprehensively ban chemical weapons under any circumstances,
there seems to be no legally sound reason to maintain the comprehensive
ban against the sophistication of delivery methods enabling precision
strikes of incapacitating chemical agents enhanced by nanotechnology on
lawful targets.101
This observation can be further contextualized when the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is compared with the historical development
of the ban on asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The idea to prohibit the
employment of projectiles whose sole purpose is to spread asphyxiating or
deleterious gases was opened for discussion during the 1899 Hague Conference. Disagreement, although expressed only by the U.S. delegate,
99. A similar rationale is offered on the prohibition of poison as a weapon in the
Commentary on Additional Protocol I, which observes that “poison is unlawful in itself, as
would be any weapon which would, by its very nature, be so imprecise that it would inevitably cause indiscriminate damage.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,
supra note 75, ¶ 1402.
100. U.N. Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and
the Effects of Their Possible Use 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/7575/Rev.1–S/9292/Rev.1 (1969)
(“The fear today is that the scientific and technological advances of the past few decades
have increased the potential of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to such
an extent that one can conceive of their use causing casualties on a scale greater than one
would associate with conventional warfare. . . . [T]he outstanding characteristics of this
class of weapons, particularly bacteriological (biological) weapons, is the variability,
amounting, under some circumstances to unpredictability, of their effects.”).
101. It should be remembered, however, that, as explained earlier, weapons are not
always prohibited on rational, legally sound grounds. One may recall that the U.S. proposal to exempt anti-personnel landmines equipped with self-destruction or selfdeactivation features has been rejected in favor of a comprehensive ban. See, e.g., Michael
Dolan & Chris Hunt, Negotiating in the Ottawa Process: The New Multilateralism, 5(3) CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY JOURNAL 25, 41–45 (1998).
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stemmed from the basic question as to whether “it is no more cruel to asphyxiate one’s enemies by means of deleterious gases than with water, that
is to say, by drowning them, as happens when a vessel is sunk by the torpedo of a torpedo-boat.”102 Captain Schéine, the Russian delegate, rejected
this comparison by pointing out that:
Many persons may be saved even if they have been wounded or placed
out of action, in case a vessel is sunk by a torpedo. Asphyxiating gases, on
the contrary, would exterminate the whole crew.
This procedure would therefore be contrary to the humane idea which
ought to guide us, namely, that of finding means of putting enemies out
of action without putting them out of the world.103

This debate ended with the almost unanimous adoption of the 1899 Hague
Declaration prohibiting the use of projectiles whose sole purpose was to
spread asphyxiating or deleterious gases (only the United States objected),104 a rule which was subsequently reaffirmed in Article 23(e) of the 1907
Hague Regulations. 105 Jean Pascal Zanders observes that asphyxiating or
deleterious gases were seen at that time as a novel weapon and the product
of scientific advance, whose barbarous, treacherous and cruel nature was
similar to poison, which had been condemned universally as an ancient and
barbaric form of warfare.106 Likewise, Frits Kalshoven observes that “the
overriding argument in favour of a ban on use was their barbaric and unnecessarily cruel, that is, inhumane character.”107 It is thus clear that the
primary rationale for the prohibition of asphyxiating or deleterious gases
concerned the second thesis of humanity according protection to those
who might lawfully be targeted from certain forms of killing.
As explained above, the central concern of the parties to the CWC was
the impact of chemical weapons on civilian lives, rather than with the protection of combatants from death caused by chemical reaction, as evi102. Third meeting of The Hague First Commission, June 22, 1899, in SCOTT, supra
note 57, at 283 (Remarks of Captain Alfred T. Mahan).
103. Id.
104. Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, supra note 20.
105. Hague Regulations, supra note 13.
106. Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An
Ambiguous Legacy, 8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 391, 406 (2003).
107. Kalshoven, supra note 52, at 216.
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denced by the Convention provisions addressing chemicals that can cause
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals, as well
as those that can cause death. However, as applications of nanotechnology
enable precise delivery of incapacitating chemical agents at specific lawful
targets or greater control of the incapacitating effects of chemical agents,
the dilemma, which might well have already been recognized, will start to
become clearer. That is, that it is prohibited to use nanotechnologyenhanced incapacitating chemical agents delivered by a precision device,
also enhanced by applications of nanotechnology, while it is not prohibited
to achieve the same military outcome by using the same device to deliver
an explosive munition and detonate in close proximity to (e.g., just above
the head of) the lawful target.108
Suppose that in both instances the risk of civilian casualties is completely eliminated. Whether a consensus will then emerge among States for
an introduction of a new law or a change to the existing law that focuses
more on the second thesis of humanity would depend upon their balancing
of the military necessity-humanity equation with respect to the manner in
which lawful targets can be attacked. How will States interpret the balance
between military necessity and humanity if nanotechnology enables the development of incapacitating chemical agents that can be applied with great
assurance and precision on chosen lawful targets? Will States insist on
maintaining the integrity of existing treaty prohibitions on biochemical
weapons, thus precluding the acquisition of potentially more humane options than currently exist? These are the questions that will confront States
and the public conscience as nanotechnology contributes to the sophistication of the application of force that eliminates (or at least greatly reduces)
the risk of civilian casualties.
V.

CONCLUSION

As is the case with any new technology, it is expected that nanotechnology
will change the way in which wars can be fought. For example, nanotechnology will enable existing weapons to be more discriminate by allowing
mechanical precision and manipulation of attacks, as well as more focused
application of force. The existing weapons law principles and rules are both
broad enough to address development of weapons enabled or enhanced by
108. Assuming that detonating the explosive inside the human body or upon impact
with the human tissue is considered to violate the superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle.
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applications of nanotechnology, and specific enough to exclude them if
prohibited under the existing weapons treaties. However, as this article has
discussed, the exploitation of the unique ability provided by nanotechnology is likely to produce more cases caught by the “weapons law paradox,”
the situation that leaves intrinsically illegal weapons under the general principles unregulated, while weapons that do not conflict with the general
principles are found to be regulated by a specific weapons treaty.
The examination of two recent debates concerning the degree of injury
or harm inflicted upon lawful targets, namely, the power to kill or capture
and the legality of incapacitating chemical agents, has revealed that the role
of the second thesis of humanity as a countervailing factor to military necessity has not been duly taken into account beyond its manifestation in the
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering principle. As nanotechnology
contributes to the sophistication in application of force that eliminates (or
at least greatly reduces) the risk of civilian casualties, it is expected that the
focus of the debate will shift from what is an acceptable risk to civilian lives
to what is an acceptable form of disabling lawful targets. The extent to
which the second thesis of humanity may play a role in shifting the focus
of this debate for the development of weapons law hinges upon how States
and the public conscience react to the emergence and widespread deployment of nanotechnology-enabled or -enhanced weapons in the battlespace;
whether they are merely content with reduction of civilian casualties during
military operations or whether they shift their attention to the questions
concerning “humane” ways to disable lawful targets.
As the history of weapons law development evidences, however, humanitarian concern is not the only motivation for States to negotiate and
conclude a treaty to prohibit or restrict the use of a particular weapon. As
Boothby observes,
In the treaty law dealing with weaponry there are frequent examples of
treaties negotiated to address weapons seen at the time as excessively injurious or as injuring an adversary in a way that pricked the international
conscience. It tends to be the combined effect of the development made
in the relevant weapons technology and the degree, or perhaps lack, of effective defences against those new developments, which constitute the
threat that, in turn, prompts the negotiation of a legal instrument. Sometimes it is the humanitarian concern aroused by the nature and/or extent
of the anticipated injury or death that is the primary motive here; some-
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times it is the recognition by certain states that the technology that others
possess poses a potentially unanswerable threat.109

At the time of writing, technological advances in weaponry are heavily concentrated in the traditional weapons manufacturing States such as the United States and Russia. Yet, nanotechnology is a transformative technology
that is being acquired and developed at an alarming pace even in countries
that have traditionally been considered technologically under-developed,
such as India, Iran and Thailand. 110 While one may expect that the preexisting technological capabilities would provide an advantage for technologically developed countries in the arms race involving nanotechnology,
well-developed weapons manufacturing infrastructures, procurement processes and integrated weapons systems based on conventional technologies
do not easily allow them to undertake the major restructure or overhaul of
existing military infrastructures necessary to take advantage of nanotechnological innovation. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a nanotechnological arms race; whether it is considered to pose a potentially unanswerable threat; and then what will be the effect on the debate concerning the meaning of humanity when people are facing the ultimate precision
strikes.

109. BOOTHBY, supra note 33, at 121–22.
110. See DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, supra note 2, at 30–33.
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